From Nairobi, Emmanuel Macron sought to close a chapter that Africa itself already considers long outdated: that of \u201cFran\u00e7afrique,\u201d networks of influence, permanent military bases, and decisions made far from the peoples concerned. On Sunday, May 10, during the \u201cAfrica Forward\u201d summit in Kenya, the French president stated that the era in which Paris was perceived as a power capable of influencing African political balances was \u201cover.\u201d He insisted that he no longer wanted Africa to be regarded as a \u201cbackyard,\u201d nor France to appear as a country able to \u201cmake or break governments.\u201d \u201cIt\u2019s over. Since 2017, that period has ended,\u201d he declared.<\/p>\n
But across the continent, such words are being received cautiously. Africa is no longer waiting merely for declarations of change; it is demanding action. With less than one year remaining in his second term, Emmanuel Macron is attempting to present the record of what he describes as a renewed African policy. Yet the decline of French influence in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and parts of West Africa shows that the rupture did not occur solely by Paris\u2019s choice. It was largely imposed by African public opinion, weary of being treated as strategic peripheries, reservoirs of raw materials, or zones for military intervention.<\/p>\n
This aspiration for sovereignty extends far beyond the French question. Africans are increasingly rejecting all forms of foreign interference, whether from former colonial powers, new military partners, international donors, or multinational corporations. The continent no longer wants to be a battleground for competition among China, Russia, T\u00fcrkiye, the Gulf states, Europe, or the United States. It wants the right to choose, negotiate, refuse, compare, and decide according to its own interests.<\/p>\n
It is in this context that the debate over the CFA franc has returned with force. How can one speak of full sovereignty when several African states remain tied to a currency inherited from the colonial order, pegged to the euro and long guaranteed by the French Treasury? Certainly, reforms have been announced, particularly in West Africa, with the end of French representation in certain monetary institutions and the still unfinished Eco currency project. But for much of Africa\u2019s youth, the symbolism remains powerful: political sovereignty cannot be complete without monetary, budgetary, and industrial sovereignty. The CFA franc has therefore become far more than an economic instrument; for its critics, it embodies the persistence of an unequal relationship that partnership rhetoric can no longer conceal.<\/p>\n
The real question raised in Nairobi is therefore not whether France has changed its tone, but whether it truly accepts losing its privileges. A \u201cbalanced partnership\u201d cannot rest on inherited mechanisms, paternalistic reflexes, or diplomatic injunctions. It requires listening to African states when they speak about security, currency, historical memory, natural resources, visas, the restitution of cultural property, or the local transformation of wealth.<\/p>\n
The Africa of 2026 is no longer the Africa summoned to endorse decisions made elsewhere. It is young, connected, demanding, marked by contradictions, yet determined to once again become the author of its own history. If the old \u201cera\u201d is truly \u201cover,\u201d then it is up to the former powers to prove it. For the future of the continent is no longer negotiated in foreign capitals: it is built first and foremost in Africa, by Africans and for Africans.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"